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Abstract—Communication on the ‘Internet of Things’ is based on 
a machine-to-machine pattern, where devices will be 
globallyaddressed and identified. However, as the number of 
connected devices increases, the burden on the network 
infrastructure increases as well. One major challenge will be the 
size of the routing tables and the efficiency of the current routing 
protocols in the Internet backbone.   To address this problem, an
IETF working group, along with the research group at Cisco, are 
working on a Locator/ID Separation Protocol as a routing 
architecture that provides new semantics for IP addressing, in
order to simplify routing operations and improve scalability in the 
future of the Internet such as the Internet of Things.  However, the 
Locator/ID Separation Protocol is still at an early stage of 
implementation and the protocol’s security, in particular, is still in 
its infancy. Therefore, this paper will investigate the security issues 
that could occur from deploying the Locator/ID Separation 
Protocol in the Internet of Things. The investigation discovers a 
number of vulnerabilities that should be considered before moving 
to the implementation stage. 
Keywords- IP, Internet of Things, ID/Locater Split Protocol, X.805,
security, thread, Trust, Attack 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoTs) is increasingly gaining the 
attention of researchers. The main concept of the IoTs is to use 
standard Internet protocols to interconnect a local network of 
smart objects world-wide for data and information harvesting 
with various functions such as identification, location, tracking, 
monitoring, etc. [1][2]. With the development of technologies 
such as radio frequency identification (RFID), embedded 
sensors, miniature actuators, and nanotechnology [3],theIoTs 
now has a wide range of real life applications, from 
transportation and logistics, health care and smart environment; 
to personal and social, gaming, robot, and city information[4]. 
With the IoTs, Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) is expected to see a paradigm shift from the current style 
of communications, that is; human-to-human, to human-to-thing 
and thing-to-thing [5].  Smart objects can connect, exchange 
information and even make decisions on behalf of users. 
However, the IoT’s environment consists of a huge number of 
devices that communicate together, which place an extra burden 
on the router algorithm in the core network.  
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is working along 
with the research group at Cisco on the Locator/ID Separation 
Protocol (LISP)[6]. Unlike IP addresses, which combine hosts’ 
locations and device IDs in a single namespace, the LISP 
separates hosts’ locations and identities. The LISP specifies an 
architecture and mechanism for replacing the addresses that are 
currently being used by IP with two separate name spaces: 
Endpoint IDs (EIDs), used within EID sites and Routing 
Locators (RLOCs), used on the transit networks such as the 
Internet infrastructure. To achieve this separation, LISP defines 
protocol mechanisms for EID to RLOC mapping.  
Moreover, LISP assumes the existence of a mapping system in 
the form of distributed database to store and propagate those 
mappings globally. The functionality of the mapping system can 
be summarised by the following: firstly, the registration stage, 
where the Map Server learns the EIDs-to-RLOC mapping from 
an authoritative LISP-Capable Router and to publish them in the 
database. Secondly, it addresses the resolving stage, where the 
Map Server (MS) accepts Map-Requests from routers, looks up 
the database and returns the requested mapping. These two 
stages will be explained in more details in section   2.1.1.  
Previous researches have concentrated mainly on defining the 
LISP overall architecture as well as the structure of the LISP 
packets such as the Map-Register Map-Notify and Map-Reply. 
Recently, in the LISP researches have started to consider the 
security as in [7] [8]. Therefore, this paper will investigate the 
security challenges resulting from deploying the LISP in the 
IoTs domain and analysing the resulting threats. The analysis 
will be based on the X.805 security standard that has been used 
to analyse the security of different systems such as [9] [10].  
The rest of this paper is organized in the following ways:  
section IIpresents some related work in literature. Section 
IIIdiscusses the security vulnerabilities and threats via X.805 in 
IoT based on the LISP Architecture. The results of the analysis 
are summarized in section IV. Finally, this paper will be 
concluded by sectionV.
II. RELATED WORKS 
2.1 An Overview of LISP  
To improve routing scalability while facilitating flexible 
address assignments in multi-homing and mobility scenarios, the 
LISP describes changes to the Internet architecture in which IP 
addresses are replaced by routing locators (RLOCs) for routing 
through the global Internet and by endpoint identifiers (EIDs) 
for identifying network sessions between devices [11]. As 
shown in Figure 1, three essential components exist in the LISP 
environment: the LISP sites (EID space), the non-LISP sites 
(RLOC space), and the LISP Mapping System which comprises 
of Map Servers and databases.  
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§ The LISP sites (EID space): They represent customer 
end-sites in exactly the same way that end-sites are 
defined today. However, the IP addresses in the EID 
space are not advertised to the non-LISP sites, but are 
published in the LISP Mapping Systems which perform 
the EID-to-RLOC mapping. The LISP functionality is 
deployed on the site's gateway or edge routers. 
Therefore, based on their roles, two types of routers are 
defined: firstly, the Ingress Tunnel Routers (ITRs) 
which receive packets from hosts and send LISP 
packets towards the Map Server. Secondly, the Egress 
Tunnel Routers (ETRs), which receive LISP packets 
from the Map Server and pass them to hosts [11] [12].
§ Non-LISP sites (RLOC space): They represent current 
sites where the IP addresses are advertised and used for 
routing purposes. 
§ LISP Mapping Systems: These are represented by Map 
Servers (MS) and are a globally distributed database 
that contains all known EID prefixes to RLOC 
mappings. Similar to the current Domain Name System 
(DNS), theMapping systems are queried by LISP-
capable devices for an EID-to-RLOC mapping. 
Fig.1.The LISP Network Architecture Design 
2.1.1 Interactions with Other LISP Components 
The functionality of the LISP goes through two stages: 
· The EID Prefix Configuration and ETR Registration 
Stage 
As explained in [13], an ETR publishes its EID-prefixes 
on a Map Server (MS) by sending LISP Map-Register 
messages which include the ETR's RLOC and a list of its 
EID-prefixes. Initially, it had been presumed that prior to 
sending a Map-Register message, the ETR and the Map 
Server must be configured with shared secret or other 
relevant authentication information. Upon the receipt of a 
Map-Register from an ETR, the Map Server checks the 
validity of the Map-Register message and acknowledges it 
by sending a Map-Notify message. When registering with 
a Map-Server, an ETR might request a no-proxy reply 
service which implies that the Map Server will forward all
the EID-to-RLOC mapping requests to the relevant ETR 
rather than dealing with them. Since no security protocol 
has been proposed yet to authenticate the ETR and secure 
the connection with the MS, the registration stage, shown 
in Figure 2, is vulnerable to serious security threats such 
as replay and poisoning attacks.
Fig.2.The ETR Registration Process 
· The Address Resolving Stage 
Once a Map Server has EID-prefixes registered by its 
client ETRs, it will accept and process Map-Requests. In 
response to a Map-Request (sent from an ITR), the Map 
Server first checks to see if the required EID matches a 
configured EID-prefix. If there is no match, the Map 
Server returns a negative Map-Reply message to the ITR. 
In case of a match, the Map Server re-encapsulates and 
forwards the resulting Encapsulated Map-Request to one 
of the registered ETRs which will return Map-Replay 
directly to the requested ITR as shown in Figure 3.The 
LISP working group in [13] has defined the structure of 
all the LISPPackets including the Map-Request, the Map-
Notify, the Map-Register and the MAP-Reply. 
Fig.3.The No Proxy Map server processing 
2.2 Overview of the The X805 
As it is described in [14], the X.805 standard proposes three 
security layers (application, services and infrastructure); three 
security planes (end user, control and management), which are 
based on the performed activatesover the network, and eight 
security dimensions to address general system vulnerabilities 
(access control, authentication, non-reputation, data 
confidentiality communication security, data integrity, 
availability, and privacy).  Figure 4 illustrates the complete 
architecture of the X.805 standard that includes the Security 
Layers of X.805 standard which has already been applied to 
different communication systems such as WiFi, ATM and IP-
based network [9] respectively.  
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Fig.4.The X.805 Standard architecture
III. ANALYSIS OF THE LISP IMPLEMENTATION IN 
THE IOT USING THE X.805. 
In this section, the X.805 security framework standard has 
been applied to analysingthe security performance of IoT based 
on the Locator Separation Protocol Network (LISP).  
The IoTs based on the LISP network aims at providing the 
network-level security. In addition, the functionality of these 
devices is only related to the Infrastructure Layer and services 
Layer of the X.805 standard. In LISP architecture there are two 
planes only: Control Plane and User Plane, they are concerned 
with the security of network links and elements as shown in 
figure 5 
Fig.5.X.805 standard for IoT base on LISP protocol 
In [15] & [16] a security implementation to LISP protocol has 
been found. However, this security protocol provides security to 
XTR (i.e. ITR and ETR) routers and not for devices that are 
connected to the architecture. Therefore, this security 
implementation has been considered in this paper.    
The Control Plan is represented as Module 2 and the User plan 
is represented as Module 3. The following dimensions explain 
vulnerabilities of the analysis that are relative to Modules 2 and 
3. Section 3.1discusses the security analysis for both 
Infrastructure and Service layers, as well as showing the 
possible threats that can occur in these layers. 
3.1 Security vulnerabilities for IoT based on LISP network for 
both Infrastructure and Service Layers 
1. Access Control: 
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: ACLs (Access Control) 
can be applied in LISP between the Ingress direction and the 
Egress direction on the LISP site-facing interface. It plays as a 
packet filtering between two networks. Therefore, ACLs are 
needed when one specific network might choose not to receive 
packets from the other networks or make connections to other 
networks.
Service Layer: Modules 2& 3: ACLs can be applied between 
an XTR router and the map services, which should be reflected 
in the registration procedure stage. Therefore, unregistered 
routers cannot send updates with the mapping system. 
Threats and Attacks: Unauthorized devices/ or illegitimate 
devices access the network. In addition to this, Dos attacks can 
intercept packets between the (ITR & ETR) and between the 
XTR router and mapping system. 
2. Authentication: 
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: users/or machines  that 
register themselves with the XTR router require authentication 
to ensure that whoever the user or the machine claims to be, it 
should be the correct one. For example, Authentication needs to 
be applied when machine (A) wants to communicate with 
machine (B). 
Service Layer:Modules 2& 3: When the Router XTR is 
registered with the mapping system, it needs to be authenticated 
with another router.
Threats and Attacks: The attackers (unauthenticated devices) 
can access the network by claiming fake identities to the router 
or the mapping system. 
3. Non-Repudiation: 
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: The links (transactions) 
need to be secured between the XTR router and the Mapping 
system. For example, routers will not claim something they do 
not provide. 
Service Layer: Modules 2& 3: Between the mapping system and 
the XTR there is an insecure link. For example, by referring to 
the registration procedure after the router has registered; the 
device sends the queries to the mapping system in order to 
register and update this device. Through the insecure link, the 
mapping system can deny the acknowledgement to the router. 
Threats and Attacks: The attacker can act as either a fake router 
or a mapping system which causes disruption or intercepts the 
data. 
4. Data Confidentiality:  
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: There is no mechanism 
such as encryption/or encoding between the machine and the 
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XTR router, and from machine to machine when they 
communicate with each other on different networks. 
Service Layer: Modules 2& 3: There is no encryption 
mechanism between the (ITR and ETR) routers and between an 
XTR and a mapping system    
Threats and Attacks: Two threats can occur here: 
EID Spoofing: The originator of the packet puts in a spoofed 
EID and the packet will normally be encapsulated by the ITR of 
the site/ or a PITR if the source site is not LISP enabled. RLOC 
Spoofing: The originator of the packet directly generates an 
LISP-encapsulated packet with a spoofed source RLoC. 
5. Communication Security:  
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: There is no security 
Tunnel/or End to End security between the machine and the 
XTR router; nor between the machine and other machines when 
they are communicating with each other on a different network. 
Service Layer: Modules 2& 3: End to End is not exiting between 
the (ITR and ETR) routers and between the XTR and mapping 
system.   
Threats and Attacks: Eavesdropping/or spoofing can occur 
between the machine and the XTR router.  Furthermore, the 
attacker is able to capture and modify all the packets exchanged 
between an Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR) and Egress Router 
(ETR) and between the XTR and mapping system. 
6. Data Integrity: 
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: There are no mechanisms
such as MD5/s or digital signatures between the machine and 
the XTR router, and between the machine and other machines 
e.g. when machine (A) wants to communicate with machine (B) 
on a different network. 
Service Layer: Modules 2& 3: No mechanisms such as MD5/or 
digital signature between Ingress and Egress and between the 
XTR and mapping system.    
Threats and Attacks: The intruder can capture the data between 
machine A and machine B, and establish a new spoofed 
connection. Adding to this, the intruder inserts itself in the 
middle of all connections (i.e. Man in Middle Attack). 
Moreover, the attacker can spoof on the transaction queries 
between (ITR and ETR) and mapping system. 
7. Availability 
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: In the router, there is only 
one scenario with invalid information i.e. Locator location and 
EID address. 
Service Layer: Modules 2& 3: Two Kinds of Availability are 
needed:Mapping systems should not be overloaded and do not 
have invalid information which affects the system scalability. 
Threats and Attacks: EID redirection/ RLOC poisoning: The 
EID/or machine-Prefix in the mapping is not bound to (located 
by) the set of RLOCs present in the mapping. This could result 
in packets being redirected elsewhere, eavesdropped, or black-
holed. Note: it is not necessarily that all RLOCs - the highest 
priority one - are compromised. Adding to this, Dos attacks 
canoccur and intercept the packet between the machine and the 
XTR and between the machine and another machine on a 
different network, and also between (ITR & ETR) and the XTR 
router and mapping system.
8. Privacy: 
Infrastructure Layer: Modules 2& 3: There is no privacy when 
data/or information is registering on the router so we have a 
security issue called information leaking. 
Service Layer: Modules 2& 3: No privacy information in the 
mapping system 
Threats and Attacks: Unauthorized entity can disclose the 
privacy of the system. 
IV. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
After analysing the security threats of theIoTs based on LISP 
network, it has been found that there is a need to provide new 
mechanisms to enforce Access control, Authentication, Non 
repudiation, Data confidentiality, Communication Security, Data 
Integrity, Availability and privacy.In this paper, two layer threats
have been considered namely; the infrastructure and Service 
layers to expose the security threats during the 
unsecuresignaltransactions between the IoTs,the LISP-capable 
routers and the mapping system. 
V. CONCLUSION  
This paper presented a comprehensive security analysis to the 
system which resulted from implementing the LISP protocol to 
support communications in the IoTs. The analysis was based on 
the X.805 security standard and considered different layers and 
planes of the system. As a result, a number of security 
vulnerabilities have been discovered and described. 
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